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Decomposing the Investment Channel of Monetary Policy



EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

EUROSYSTEM



THIS PAPER AT A GLANCE

MOTIVATION

- This paper:** How does monetary policy affect firm investment?
- Identification Challenge arises from '**Information Effect**'
 - MP shocks simultaneously affect borrowing costs and beliefs about future fundamentals
 - If FED cuts rates, borrowing gets cheaper (\uparrow Inv.), but economic outlook declines (\downarrow Inv.)
 - [Romer and Romer (2000); Campbell et al. (2012); Nakamura and Steinsson (2018)]
- Proposed fixes for high-frequency monetary policy shocks:
 - [Jarociński and Karadi (2020); Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco (2021); Bauer and Swanson (2023)]
 - Existing corrections require additional and potentially restrictive assumptions (no silver bullets)
- Identification Strategy:** Use heterogeneous exposure of European firms to the ECB's Corporate Sector Purchasing Program to estimate structural investment elasticities.

MAIN FINDINGS

- CSPP exposure generates quasi-experimental borrowing-cost variation**
 - ECB's CSPP lowered yields on eligible corporate bonds relative to ineligible bonds
 - Firms differed in pre-CSPP exposure due to sticky debt portfolios
 - \Rightarrow Cross-sectional variation isolates a **pure cost-of-debt shock**
- Investment reacts more strongly to pure borrowing-cost shocks**
 - Main 2SLS estimates imply sizable investment elasticity to cost of debt
 - Aggregate MP-shock estimates are about **one third smaller** than the borrowing-cost channel
- Three Implications**
 - Aggregate investment channel of monetary policy is offset by sizable information effect.
 - Conventional estimates understate the investment channel of MP absent CB information
 - Calibration of macro models using the aggregate investment response can be misspecified.

A SIMPLE MODL OF FIRM INVESTMENT WITH INFORMATION EFFECTS

Environment

- Two periods $t = 1, 2$ (short-run, long-run). Economy's state $\theta \in \{G, B\}$ in Period 2 is stochastic.
- In Period 1, a firm invests in projects k with state-dependent returns $R_k(G) > R_k(B)$
- Firm faces user cost of capital $(i+r)$ with idiosyncratic component r .

Information Channel

- CB receives a private noisy signal $s \in \{H, L\}$ that the economy does well in the long run.
- Central bank announces a MP surprise from i_{old} to $i \rightarrow$ perfect signal for $s \in \{H, L\}$
- Firms update beliefs on economy's future state from p to $p_s = P(\theta = G | s)$


Investment Decision

- Conditional on belief $\bar{p} \in \{p_L, p, p_H\}$, project k has expected gross returns of:

$$R_k(\bar{p}) := \bar{p}R_k(G) + (1 - \bar{p})R_k(B)$$

- $F_{\bar{p}}(\mathcal{R})$ denotes the CDF for expected gross returns \rightarrow Share of funded projects is $1 - F_{\bar{p}}(i+r)$.

Decomposing the Investment Response



Proposition

If the central bank cuts rates from i_{old} to i , signaling $s = L$, the firm's investment response is

$$\Delta_{i_{old} \rightarrow i} \mathcal{I} = \underbrace{F_p(r + i_{old}) - F_p(r + i)}_{\text{Borrowing Cost Channel}} - \underbrace{[F_{PL}(r + i) - F_p(r + i)]}_{\text{Information Effect}}$$


EMPIRICAL SETUP

Institutional Background

- The **Corporate Sector Purchase Program**

"[...] we decided to include investment-grade euro-denominated bonds issued by non-bank corporations established in the euro area in the list of assets that are eligible for regular purchases [...]"

— ECB Monetary policy decisions, 10 March 2016, 14:30 CET



- We conduct a **before-after comparison**

$$y_{it} = \alpha_i + \lambda_t + \gamma_{treat \times post} \times Treat_i \times Post_t + \epsilon_{it}$$


Dep. Variable	Yields				Yield Spreads			
	ALL	INCO	CURR	DUAL	ALL	INCO	CURR	DUAL
Post \times Treat	-8.6*	7.5	-2.8	-17.5***	-4.8	6.2	5.0	-13.1***
	(4.2)	(15.2)	(4.8)	(2.0)	(4.1)	(15.1)	(4.7)	(1.9)
# Observations	221k	137k	133k	173k	221k	137k	133k	173k
Bond & Time FEs	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
F-Statistic	67.9	12.6	26.9	2974.2	21.3	8.7	86.0	1698.9

- Finding 1:** Conducting a before-after comparison on 1,956 European bonds akin to Todorov (2020), we find that the CSPP reduced yield spreads by 13.1 bps.

- Empirically, for each time window h , we estimate the event study regression:

$$\Delta_h y_{i,tCSPP} = \alpha_h + \gamma_h \times D_i + \epsilon_i$$


- Under a model of segmented corporate bond markets (akin to Greenwood et al. (2018)) we calibrate market segmentation to match the empirical spreads γ_h .



- Finding 2:** The difference is driven by imperfect arbitrage. We can match heterogeneous effects in a model of market segmentation a la Greenwood et al. (2018)

Firm Exposure

- The scope of our analysis is 183 large European non-financial firms that issue investment-grade corporate bonds. We calculate the pre-CSPP (2015 Q4) reliance on eligible bonds: s_f



EMPIRICAL RESULTS


Shift-Share Instrument

- We use firm exposure s_f from 2015 as an instrument for the change in firms' interest-to-debt-ratio

- Notation: $\Delta_h X_f \equiv \log(X_{f,2015+h}) - \log(X_{f,2015})$

$$\Delta_h r_{f,t} = \alpha s_f + \gamma X_{f,t} + \epsilon_{f,t}$$

$$\Delta_h Y_{f,t} = \delta \Delta_h \hat{r}_{f,t} + \tilde{\gamma} X_{f,t} + \tilde{\epsilon}_{f,t}$$



- For the same 183 firms, we study investment elasticities from MP shocks (Altavilla et al., 2019) between 2005 and 2019.

- MP_t reflects aggregated high-frequency changes around ECB monetary policy decisions in the 3-month OIS rate.

$$\Delta r_{f,t} = \alpha MP_t + \gamma X_{f,t} + \epsilon_{f,t}$$

$$\Delta Y_{f,t} = \delta \Delta \hat{r}_{f,t} + \tilde{\gamma} X_{f,t} + \tilde{\epsilon}_{f,t}$$

	Borrowing Cost Shock		Joint MP Shock	
	2SLS	Fuller	2SLS	Fuller
Total Asset Growth	0.98**	0.83**	0.30**	0.27**
	(0.47)	(0.38)	(0.14)	(0.12)
First stage F	5.05		6.94	
Obs	138		998	

- Annualized investment elasticities are:

- Elasticity of 0.414 when isolating the borrowing cost channel (semi-elasticity = 19%).
- Elasticity of 0.27 for a joint MP shock comprising of the information effect (semi-elasticity = 11.7%).

- \Rightarrow **Finding: Aggregate MP-Shock estimates are 33% smaller than the isolated borrowing cost channel.**

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